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Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 63
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 4 October 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to our letter dated 27 August 1999, I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded on 5, 9, 10, 20 and 21 September 1999.

On 5 September, fifteen (15) F-16, two (2) C-160, one (1) C-130, as well as one (1) CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations. The 15 F-16 violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia before exiting towards a south-easterly direction. The two C-160 and the C-130 violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia, also exiting thereafter in a south-easterly direction, before re-entering the Nicosia flight information region, again violating international air traffic regulations. The aircraft in question returned afterwards to the flight information region of Ankara. The CN-235 violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia, patrolling afterwards over the area of the Cape of Apostolos Andreas in a search and rescue role, before exiting.

On 9 September, four (4) F-16, as well as one (1) C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region violating international air traffic regulations. The four F-16 (two of which entered the Nicosia flight information region twice, violating international air traffic regulations) violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying over the areas of Kyrenia and Apostolos Andreas, before returning to the flight information region of Ankara. The C-160 violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas region),

exiting thereafter in a south-easterly direction, before re-entering the Nicosia flight information region, again violating international air traffic regulations, as well as the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, again flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas region). The aircraft in question returned afterwards to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 10 September, fifteen (15) F-16, two (2) C-130, one (1) C-160, one (1) C-235 Turkish military aircraft as well as one (1) AB-205 military helicopter entered the Nicosia flight information region violating international air traffic regulations. The 15 F-16 violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying over the area of Karpasia, before exiting towards the flight information region of Ankara. The two C-130 and the C-160 violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying over the area of Karpasia, exiting thereafter in a south-easterly direction. The CN-235 violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia, patrolling afterwards over the area of the Cape of Apostolos Andreas in a search and rescue role, before exiting. The AB-205 military helicopter entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations. The helicopter in question violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying above the area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, at 1807 hours, from where it departed at 1826 hours, landing afterwards at the illegal airport of Krini in the occupied area of the Republic.

On 20 September, one (1) B200 Turkish aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations. The aircraft in question violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying over the area of Mesaoria, before landing, at 1025 hours, at the illegal airport of Tymbou, in the occupied area of the Republic, from where it departed at 1341 hours, returning to the flight information region of Ankara.

On 21 September, one (1) F-4 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia flight information region, violating international air traffic regulations. The F-4 violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying over the area of Karpasia, before exiting in a south-easterly direction.

As stated in my previous letters, these unauthorized Turkish intrusions into the Nicosia flight information region and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus are in violation of international air traffic rules and, at the same time, they are in contravention to the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I wish to strongly protest these new provocative acts by Turkey, which demonstrate once more Turkey's blatant disregard of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and all the relevant decisions of the Organization on the question of Cyprus.

I would also like to underline that the present violations occurred after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1251 (1999) which called upon all States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty,

independence and territorial integrity. My Government expects that the Turkish side will show compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolutions.

I would also like to underline that such actions take place at a time when the international community is expecting a different attitude from the Turkish side, more specifically a positive response for the convening of comprehensive negotiations for a just settlement of the Cyprus problem, as called for in Security Council resolution 1250 (1999).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sotos ZACKHEOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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7 October 1999

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LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the attached communication dated 6 October 1999 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

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Annex

Letter dated 6 October 1999 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 16 of its resolution 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency is requested to submit consolidated progress reports to the Council every six months, commencing on 11 April 1996.[a]

As the Security Council is aware, the Agency has not been in a position, since 16 December 1998, to implement its mandate in Iraq under the relevant Council resolutions and is thus unable to provide any measure of assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. In this context, I should record that the Agency has not received from Iraq the semi-annual declarations required in paragraph 22 and annex 2 of the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification plan. These semi-annual declarations are the principal means for the provision of information by Iraq regarding the current use and any changes in use of certain facilities, installations and sites and the inventory and location of certain materials, equipment and isotopes. The semi-annual declarations were due on 15 January and 15 July 1999.

As I have previously reported, there is no technical impediment to the Agency's full implementation in Iraq of its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant resolutions and, as part of the plan, to continue to follow up on the few remaining questions and concerns relating to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and any other matter that may come to the Agency's attention.

The Agency maintains an operational plan for the resumption of its verification activities in Iraq and would be able to respond, on short notice, to a request from the Security Council to resume those activities in Iraq under the relevant resolutions.

I would take this opportunity to stress that for the Agency to fully implement the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, it is essential that the Agency retain its right to unrestricted access provided for in the relevant resolutions and as specified in the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification plan. Further, I would reiterate the importance of the necessary provisions being made for adequate, longer-term funding for the Agency's implementation of that mandate (see S/1999/127, annex, appendix, enclosure, paras. 26-28).

Please arrange to have the present letter issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed ELBARADEI

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[a] The previous consolidated reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency were issued as annexes to documents S/1996/261, S/1996/833, S/1997/297, S/1999/779, S/1998/312, S/1998/927, and S/1999/393. Document S/1998/694 contained the text of an interim status report provided in response to presidential statement S/PRST/1998/11, and document S/1999/127 contained the text of an interim status report provided in response to a note by the President of the Security Council (S/1999/100).

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Fifty-fourth session
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QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 6 October 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 6 October 1999 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex, which contains a letter from Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, concerning the address made by Glafkos Clerides, the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session, on 23 September, would be circulated as a document of the Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volkan VURAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 6 October 1999 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the statement dated 25 September 1999 by Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in connection with the statement by the Greek Cypriot leader, Glafcos Clerides, on 23 September 1999 before the United Nations General Assembly.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its enclosure circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Enclosure

Statement by Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus issued at Lefkoşa on 25 September 1999

I am dismayed by the speech delivered by Mr. Clerides purporting to speak on behalf of "Cyprus", at the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 1999. Mr. Clerides, in his above-mentioned speech as well as in his recent statements, has been putting forward the following preconditions against the Turkish Cypriot people:

(a) He claims that the "Republic of Cyprus", which has been converted into a Greek Cypriot administration as a result of the forcible expulsion of the Turkish Cypriot people in 1963, is legitimate and represents the whole of Cyprus;

(b) He states that the inhuman embargoes imposed by the Greek Cypriot side will not be lifted;

(c) He reiterates that the unilateral and illegal European Union accession process of the Greek Cypriot side will be pursued;

(d) He continues to reject the sovereignty of the Turkish Cypriot side;

(e) He sets the precondition for the negotiations on the existence of the so-called "Republic of Cyprus", entailing single sovereignty, single international identity and single citizenship.

It is also pertinent to look at the practices of the Greek Cypriot administration and Mr. Clerides, who sets the above preconditions. Mr. Clerides, while mentioning demilitarization, is trying to disguise the fact that his administration has already completed military integration with Greece. It should not be forgotten that Mr. Clerides, while paying lip service to stability in the eastern Mediterranean, has at the same time attempted to deploy Russian S-300 missiles and proceeded to give military bases to Greece. The Greek Cypriot administration has not agreed even to the package of measures designed to reduce tensions as proposed by the United Nations over the last two years. A concrete example of Mr. Clerides' attempted distortion of facts is that he is trying to place onto others the responsibility for the political, economic, cultural and sportive embargoes implemented against the Turkish Cypriot people since 1963. This is Mr. Clerides' mentality.

Mr. Clerides, while insisting on the above preconditions, is attempting to hide the fact that the 1960 Republic of Cyprus was a partnership republic, that neither of the co-founder peoples constituting that partnership had the right to dominate the other and that by destroying the 1960 partnership republic through genocide the Greek Cypriot side still continues unabashedly in its attempts to covert it into a Greek Cypriot republic.

Mr. Clerides, by distorting reality, has tried to present the Cyprus issue as an internal matter which could be settled by certain constitutional arrangements. Mr. Clerides has also made known what his side expects from the Turkish Cypriots: to give up their sovereignty and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and agree to a kind of provincial rule in line with a settlement framework of their own perception. This is an illusion.

Mr. Clerides has also directed false accusations against our motherland, Turkey, which has prevented genocide, averted Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) and brought peace to the island for the last 26 years. Mr. Clerides has shown that he has no intention of abandoning the court cases instituted against Turkey in disregard of our existence and placed as an impediment against the negotiating process. Mr. Clerides' unacceptable mentality and expressed views only deepen the crisis of confidence on the island and once again demonstrates the lack of common ground for negotiation between the two sides. I am hopeful that the international community will draw the necessary conclusions from this situation.

In Cyprus, there exist two separate sovereign peoples. In 1960, the Turkish Cypriot people exercised its sovereign will in favour of a political compromise, and thus the 1960 partnership was established. When in 1963 the Greek Cypriots destroyed the partnership and resorted to violence with the aim of taking over the whole island, the Turkish Cypriot people exercised its free will in defence of its sovereignty and determination not to succumb to the Greek Cypriot yoke, and spent years in search of a final settlement through negotiations that would protect these rights. In the face of the continuing attempts by the Greek Cypriot leadership to take over the island, the Turkish Cypriot people exercised its sovereign will in favour of establishing its own State, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Presently each side exists under its own democracy, constitution and self-administration. In Cyprus the issue at hand is the attainment of a political agreement and reconciliation between the two States. To this end, it is necessary, above all, to create an atmosphere of trust and a common ground between the two sides. Mr. Clerides, in his recent statement, has shown, once again, how removed he is from the idea of reconciliation.

In order to reach a political solution, the preconditions set by the Greek Cypriot side must be removed, the sovereignty of the Turkisn Cypriot people must be respected and their equal status must be accepted. If progress in the Cyprus issue has so far eluded us, the reason is to be sought in the 40-year-old Greek Cypriot policy of domination and the preconditions being put forward in this connection.

It is not possible to get anywhere with the mentality displayed by Mr. Clerides.

We have put forward our confederation proposal of 31 August 1998 in a constructive spirit for peace and reconciliation. We will continue with patience to defend our rights.

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Deputy Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991.

2. The present report is the eighth semi-annual report by the Special Commission following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, in paragraph 16 of which the Council called for the consolidation of the reports required under the Council's resolutions 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991 and 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991.[1]

[1] The Commission's 25 previous reports called for under these resolutions are contained in documents S/23165, S/23268, S/23801, S/24108 and Corr.1, S/24661, S/24984, S/25620, S/25977, S/26684, S/26910, S/1994/489, S/1994/750, S/1994/1138 and Corr.1, S/1994/1422 and Add.1, S/1995/284, S/1995/494, S/1995/864, S/1995/1038, S/1996/258, S/1996/848, S/1997/301, S/1997/774, S/1998/332, S/1998/529, S/1998/920 and S/1999/401.

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12. The field office in Bahrain is being held in caretaker status to preserve the capability to restart work as effectively and quickly as possible once the Security Council decides on future arrangements. In July the Commission moved the field office to a new location, in Manama, at the request of the Bahraini authorities. The Commission wishes to put on record its appreciation for the Government of Bahrain's generous provision of such facilities.

13. The Commission is grateful to those Governments that provide support and information relevant to its mandate. Additional information, in particular with respect to supplier data related to Iraq's prohibited programmes, would be of considerable value in assessing Iraq's compliance.

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EIGHTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1230 (1999) of 26 February 1999, the Security Council decided to review every 45 days, on the basis of reports of the Secretary-General, the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) in the light of the progress achieved towards implementation of commitments made by the President of the Central African Republic to the Secretary-General in his letter dated 23 January 1999 (S/1999/98, annex).

2. In accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 1230 (1999), the previous report on the Central African Republic (S/1999/788) was submitted on 15 July 1999. During the consideration of that report, it was agreed that the next report should be submitted on 30 September after the first round of the presidential election, which, at that time, was scheduled to take place on 29 August 1999. However, the subsequent postponements of the election to 19 September and the announcement of the results on 3 October, as well as the overall political and security situation in the Central African Republic, have made it necessary to delay the submission of the present report. As requested by the Security Council in paragraph 17 of resolution 1230 (1999), the report contains recommendations with regard to a transition to post-conflict peace-building.

II. PREPARATIONS FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

3. Since my seventh report to the Council (S/1999/788), events in the Central African Republic have been dominated to a large extent by the preparations for the presidential election by the Mixed and Independent Electoral Commission (CEMI), which was assisted by MINURCA and various external donors, the campaign by political parties and the first round of the election, which took place on 19 September after two consecutive postponements.

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A. Activities of the Mixed and Independent Electoral Commission

4. By the end of July, CEMI and its international partners had made substantial progress in preparing for the elections on 29 August, as originally scheduled. However, in late August, CEMI informed MINURCA and donors that some of the lists of voters in the provinces prepared by its electoral staff were defective and could not form the basis of a credible election. Several of the lists contained multiple registrations and other irregularities; their verification of the lists had therefore to be repeated. In the circumstances, CEMI recommended to President Ange-Félix Patassé a postponement of the first round of the election to 12 or 19 September. After extensive and sometimes tense consultations within his Government and with my Special Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, President Patassé agreed to the dates of 12 September for the first round and 3 October for the second round. A decree to that effect was issued on 12 August.

5. As the expected date of the election of 12 September was drawing closer, it became evident that the required volume of ballot papers could not be printed in time. CEMI, with the support of donors, subcontracted to other printing houses to increase the output of ballot papers. However, when MINURCA assessed the state of preparations for the elections on 10 September, it appeared that there were significant shortages of ballot papers, which could not be corrected in time for the election on 12 September. There had also been attempts on the part of some opposition candidates to disrupt and even prevent the printing of ballot papers. CEMI therefore had no choice but to recommend a second postponement to 19 September, which was announced on 11 September by President Patassé.

B. Political campaign

6. In accordance with the electoral law, the nomination of candidates for the presidential election ended on 29 August. By that date, 10 candidates had been duly registered: Joseph Abossolo (independent), David Dacko (Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement), Abel Goumba (Front patriotique pour le progrès), Fidèle Guandjika (independent), André Kolingba (Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain) Enoch Dérant Lakoué (Parti social démocrate), Charles Massi (Forum démocratique pour la modernité), Jean-Paul Ngoupande (Parti de l'unité nationale), Ange-Félix Patassé (Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricaine), and Henri Pouzère (independent).

7. The electoral campaign started on 29 August for a two-week period. As it gathered momentum, the tone became more combative and reports indicated that some political parties were discreetly recruiting personnel for militias. While participating in the campaign, several opposition candidates began insisting that the election be postponed by another five weeks. They alleged that President Patassé was rushing the election, and accused MINURCA of helping him to do so. However, it was obvious that a five-week postponement would have meant holding the election after the term of office of the incumbent President expired, and would have led to a constitutional crisis.

8. On 23 August 1999, several candidates sent a letter to President Patassé asking that the election be postponed to a later date. In that letter, they

claimed that electoral preparations left much to be desired, that opposition candidates had no access to the state media and that their security could not be guaranteed. To address those concerns, President Patassé convened a meeting on 27 August of all presidential candidates and political party leaders, as well as the diplomatic community and MINURCA. The Chairman of CEMI informed the meeting that preparations for the election were on course. Prime Minister Anicet Dologuele stated that security conditions for the election would be assured and promised to assign to each candidate four bodyguards from the armed forces. He also assured all candidates that they would have access to the state media, which they had never been denied in the first place. My Special Representative indicated that CEMI's preparations for the election were indeed on course, that there were no major technical reasons why the election could not be held on 12 September and that further delay would seriously complicate the assistance provided by the international community. The meeting ended with the understanding that the election would go ahead as recommended by CEMI on 12 September.

9. As part of their campaign for a further postponement, some of the opposition candidates stated that they would not accept a victory by President Patassé and that, were he to be declared the winner, they would call for mass protests. One candidate, André Kolingba, claimed that he had the support of the army.

10. As the election date drew near, the political situation grew increasingly charged. Unsubstantiated accusations that MINURCA and the international community were less than impartial grew louder. MINURCA staff came under threat of attack in Bangui and in some other parts of the country, where support for the opposition parties was relatively strong. Several clashes took place among militants of some political parties. A violent incident in the Sixth Quarter of Bangui on 10 September between supporters of rival political parties resulted in several deaths and injuries.

11. When, owing to problems related to the printing of ballot papers, CEMI recommended another postponement of one week, the tension eased somewhat. However, a few days before the election two lawyers acting on behalf of the opposition candidates requested the Council of State to declare the presidential decree postponing the election to 19 September unconstitutional.

C. Electoral support by the Mission

12. Throughout the period, MINURCA continued to work closely with CEMI and donors in the preparations for the election. Its electoral unit actively supported the efforts of CEMI, providing technical advice and direct assistance at critical moments. United Nations troops guarded sensitive electoral materials and provided security at electoral sites in Bangui as well as in the provinces. They were assisted by 360 Central African Armed Forces (FACA) soldiers made available for the purpose by the Government, with financial support by France. In consultation with CEMI, MINURCA established 10 deployment sites in the provinces to facilitate logistic support and communications for the electoral observers. In accordance with the concept of operations described in paragraph 22 of my sixth report on MINURCA (S/1999/621), 30 United Nations

long-term observers were deployed to those sites and in Bangui by the end of July.

13. On 26 August, MINURCA started the distribution of electoral materials. Owing to the size of the country and poor infrastructure, extensive air support was required to ensure the timely delivery and retrieval of materials. The United Nations therefore made some of its aircraft available to CEMI.

14. On 1 September, the United Nations began deploying its 200 short-term observers to electoral sites throughout the country. Half of that number were recruited locally from MINURCA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) embassies, consulates, non-governmental organizations and other international organizations operating in the country. The remaining 100 were drawn from United Nations Headquarters and other United Nations offices, predominantly in Africa and Europe. The short-term observers were deployed in 85 teams, of which 50 teams went to the provinces, while the remaining 35 were deployed in Bangui and its environs. The teams were able to observe the process at about 45 per cent of polling stations throughout the country.

15. During the month of August, MINURCA also deployed the essential additional military personnel and equipment to support the election. Thirty-one communications personnel were made available by the Government of Canada and 91 logistic and medical personnel, together with 15 armoured personnel carriers, were made available by the Government of Egypt.

D. Public information

16. MINURCA stepped up its information activities ahead of the election in order to sensitize the population to the electoral process and to explain the United Nation role in supporting CEMI. Candidates from all competing political parties were given access to state media, while CEMI was also given extensive access to Radio MINURCA. Radio MINURCA broadcast many programmes on civil education and the role of the population in the election. Shortwave coverage of the Central African Republic by radio MINURCA improved in early August, with its programmes increasingly reflecting the needs of the local population. From 31 August to 2 September, the United Nations also organized a three-day seminar on the role of the press in the electoral process; 73 journalists participated in the event.

17. On the eve of the election, I issued a statement to the press, which was widely disseminated in local languages, calling on the people of the Central African Republic to exercise their democratic responsibility calmly and responsibly. The statement of the President of the Security Council to the press made on 14 September was also widely circulated in the country.

18. On the weekend of the presidential election, special programmes were broadcast by the United Nations, while on election day, 19 September, Radio MINURCA broadcast the entire day. Officials of the United Nations electoral unit joined Radio MINURCA announcers every hour to provide updates from the field and the Bangui area.

III. CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION

A. Voting

19. The first round of the election took place, as scheduled, on 19 September. Voters turned out in relatively high numbers, estimated at close to 60 per cent. There were some technical problems owing to the shortage of ballot papers in several polling stations in Bangui, as well as in some provincial towns. MINURCA assisted CEMI in resupplying the ballot papers in the provincial areas concerned, where the voting had to be extended to 22 and 23 September. There were a few isolated attempts to intimidate voters and disrupt the electoral process, which were quickly dealt with by local authorities.

20. On 22 September, MINURCA observers and those of the Francophonie and the European Union issued separate statements in which they declared that the election had been conducted in a peaceful, transparent and credible atmosphere. The statements acknowledged that there had been some irregularities, owing mainly to the late opening of polling stations and delays caused by the unstructured compilation of the voters lists. However, such cases were considered to be minor and limited and of insufficient gravity to cast doubts on the fairness and transparency of the election. Also on 22 September, a group of local non-governmental organizations, which had monitored the election as national observers, released their report, the findings of which concurred with the positive conclusions of the international observers.

B. Response of opposition candidates

21. On 23 September, all but one of the opposition candidates issued a joint statement, in which they claimed that the latest postponement of the election was unconstitutional and that irregularities during the election affected their credibility. In particular, they complained that there had been a shortage of ballot papers of opposition candidates in most of the voting centres; that several non-official polling stations had been opened throughout the country; that ballot papers had been unavailable in Ngaoundaye and Birao; and that printing of ballot papers had continued until 21 September.

22. The statement also accused President Patassé of preparing a unilateral declaration of victory and indicated that the opposition would not accept the formal results of the election if they showed President Patassé to be the winner. The opposition therefore urged the Central African people to resist, through civil disobedience, what they said would be President Patassé's "electoral coup d'état". In a radio broadcast on 24 September, the Government stated in response that it would deal ruthlessly with anyone who attempted to disturb the peace in the country.

C. Announcement of the results

23. On 2 October, the President of the Constitutional Court announced the official results of the election, according to which President Patassé received an absolute majority of 51.63 per cent of the vote. The President of the Court

therefore pronounced that President Patassé had been re-elected as President with a mandate of six years and that no second round of voting would be held. President Patassé's new term will start when he is sworn in, which is expected to take place on 17 October. Former President Kolingba received 19.38 per cent of the vote and former President Dacko 11.15 per cent. Overall turnout was 56.4 per cent.

24. In verifying the results of the election, the Constitutional Court also addressed some of the irregularities claimed by the opposition. In particular, the Court did not accept the results from the extension of voting to 22 and 23 September that had occurred in a few areas.

25. The city of Bangui and the provincial capitals remained relatively calm after the announcement of the results. No major incidents were reported. In a radio broadcast after the announcement, President Patassé appealed to the population to ensure peace and security, stressing that the results should not lead to hate and despair, or arrogance and triumphalism. In a statement dated 3 October, eight of the nine opposition candidates continued to reject the results and called for new elections. However, on 4 October, the leading opposition candidate, General Kolingba, made a radio statement in which he said that, although the election had been flawed, this did not justify creating unrest and that he had therefore urged his followers to calm down.

26. Following the announcement of the results and the declaration that there would be no second round of voting, MINURCA started its withdrawal from electoral sites in the provinces, which is to be completed by mid-October.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SITUATION OF REFUGEES

27. During the reported period, MINURCA continued to receive reports of cases of arbitrary detentions and ill-treatment of prisoners. There have also been reports of extrajudicial executions, in particular the summary execution of six alleged bandits between 20 and 23 August by the Commander of the Office centrafricaine de répression du banditisme (OCRB). MINURCA demanded that this practice be stopped immediately.

28. Religious and ethnic tensions continued to surface. Some incidents of intimidation and harassment against the Muslim community have also been reported. Trade unionists and journalists reported cases of intimidation in the politically contentious period prior to the election, though many journalists have themselves demonstrated a measure of irresponsibility in their reporting. During the electoral campaign both government and opposition supporters engaged in hate speeches.

29. In addition to its regular advocacy activities, MINURCA implemented a broad programme of human rights training for 180 new police recruits. It also completed a specialized programme of training for 383 police officials, including brigade commanders of the gendarmerie and the judicial police.

30. The situation of refugees in the Central African Republic remains a matter of serious concern. There are presently more than 52,000 refugees of various

nationalities in the country, of whom more than 13,000 are from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The presence of some 6,000 refugees in Bangui was a matter of particular concern during the election. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Bangui, through the media and other means, advised refugees against getting involved in any political and electoral matters. To ease the tension in the capital, UNHCR also transported refugees from Bangui to the rural settlement in Boubou.

31. Some 2,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo are at present awaiting repatriation in temporary shelters in the port area of Bangui, living in worrisome health and sanitary conditions. Authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are expected soon in Bangui to assist the process of voluntary repatriation.

32. On 6 August, a summit of Heads of State of the region was held in Libreville to address the issue of refugees in Africa. The summit was chaired by President Omar Bongo of the Gabonese Republic and attended by several Heads of State and Foreign Ministers from the Central African region. The main subject of discussion was the need to establish an intra-regional mechanism aimed at helping the countries concerned to ensure better control and management of the movements of refugees and displaced persons in the region.

V. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

A. Security concerns arising from the election

33. Following a general increase in tension during the electoral campaign, security was tightened around United Nations installations and the movements of staff were limited. MINURCA troops increased patrolling throughout Bangui and its environs and made preparations to deal with disturbances during the election and after the announcement of the results.

34. My Special Representative kept close contact with local authorities, President Patassé and opposition candidates. He urged all concerned to remain calm and to respect the outcome of the election. Mr. Adeniji also visited or contacted several regional leaders, in particular President Bongo of Gabon, and asked them to exercise their influence with both President Patassé and the main opposition leaders. In response, President Bongo sent a high-level delegation to the Central African Republic for discussions with the Government and the opposition.

B. Impact of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

35. As described in my previous report, following the fall of Gbadolite to Congolese rebels under the control of Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), thousands of civilian and military refugees started crossing to the Mobaye area of the Central African Republic. Another influx of refugees occurred when the town of Zongo, across the river from Bangui, was taken by MLC troops on 30 July. The total influx reached about 20,000, which included about 7,000 Congolese government troops.

36. The presence of these refugees, and in particular of soldiers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, created several problems. The Mobaye area could not cope with such a large number of refugees, which placed a heavy burden on the limited infrastructure and social amenities. There were also fears that the refugees' presence would hamper electoral campaigns in the area. However, thanks to the logistic support provided by the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the form of transport aircraft, all Congolese military personnel have been repatriated, without their weapons, to Kinshasa. Mr. Bemba visited the Central African Republic twice during the reporting period for consultations with the Central African authorities.

37. Frequent patrols of the Oubangui river by rebel Congolese soldiers who now control Zongo continue to cause anxiety among the population of Bangui. MINURCA is often inundated with calls about alleged landings in Bangui by Congolese soldiers on unknown missions. Similar patrols by the Special Force for the Defence of Republican Institutions (FORSDIR), rather than give assurance, create fear. MINURCA was therefore obliged to commence regular patrols of the river by its own small amphibious unit.

C. Disarmament and the destruction of weapons

38. MINURCA disarmament activities were intensified in the period before the presidential election. There were persistent reports that some of the weapons brought into the Mobaye and Bangui areas by retreating Congolese troops had not been surrendered but clandestinely sold by the soldiers to support themselves and their families who had fled with them from Gbadolite and Zongo. Only a few of the weapons could be recovered. However, some of the weapons that had disappeared in the wake of the 1997 army mutinies were recovered by the United Nations, bringing the total number of weapons of all categories recovered in the period from December 1998 to 128 light arms, 21,724 rounds of ammunition and 243 explosives. My Special Representative is discussing with the Government the best way to dispose of those weapons.

D. Civilian police training

39. The MINURCA civilian police component continued its training programmes for the Central African police and gendarmerie. A six-month training course for 180 recruits started on 19 July. The objective of the programme is to provide the young cadres with a general training course, covering the professional and technical fields, to enable them to undertake police duties effectively in a democratic setting. By the end of 1999, 511 police officers will have been fully trained by the United Nations.

40. With regard to the gendarmerie, the last stage of training for brigade commanders was completed on 28 August, making a total of 383 officers prepared since the beginning of the programme. MINURCA is currently putting together a compendium of training manuals for the use of Central African instructors, who are already trained by MINURCA, to assure proper training of future police and gendarmerie officers after the departure of the Mission.

VI. ECONOMIC ASPECTS

41. Subsequent to the assessment made on 2 July by the Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the process of implementation of the development programme under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Agreement, the Board approved the release of the second allocation of some 7 billion CFA francs under the Agreement. This, as well as bilateral budget support assistance by China and Nigeria, has enabled the Government to meet some obligations, such as its contractual payments to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the payment of some salary arrears and payments to soldiers being sent on retirement.

42. Although the Government does not lack the political will to institute the much-needed economic reforms, there is a need for further rigorous measures for greater transparency in the conduct of government operations. Revenue generation by way of receipts from customs duties, which is the mainstay of government resources, has again been below anticipated levels. This is due in part to the low economic activities in anticipation of the presidential election. Prospective investors are waiting to make a proper evaluation of the political terrain following the installation of a new Government before taking the final plunge on economic cooperation. However, they continue to be seriously concerned at the state of security and stability in the post-MINURCA period in the absence of restructured armed forces. Subject to completion by the Government of the measures agreed upon earlier, and to adequate security arrangements, the World Bank will proceed with the appraisal of the fourth structural adjustment credit in November 1999.

43. One of the prior actions for structural adjustment credit appraisal is the Government's ability to propose a credible financial plan for gradual elimination of the financial deficit in the cotton sector, within the macroeconomic framework agreed with IMF, and curtailing recourse to Bank credit. Such a financial plan is likely to include a roll-back of producer prices, which were increased against world market trends.

44. Progress has been made in the area of privatization of government-owned enterprises. PETROCA, the state-owned petroleum company, has been liquidated. The agreement between the Government and the buyers has not been signed yet, probably because the latter are awaiting the results of the presidential election, but the signature is expected to take place shortly. Meanwhile, PETROCA remains under the direction of a liquidation team. In the banking sector, privatization of the Union bancaire en Afrique centrale (UBAC) is proceeding well, with a proposal for the purchase of 51 per cent of the shares by a Cameroon-based consortium.

VII. RESTRUCTURING AND DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

45. As I mentioned in my last report, the four bills on the restructuring of the armed forces, which were adopted by the National Assembly on 3 May 1999, were not promulgated into law by President Patassé. He instead referred them to the Constitutional Court, which advised on 2 July that several provisions in each of the laws violated the Constitution. The Government has established a

committee to incorporate the observations of the Constitutional Court into amended draft bills for the consideration of the National Assembly when it reconvenes in October. According to the Government and the President of the National Assembly, the process of consideration would be accelerated with a view to a quick adoption and promulgation.

46. Notwithstanding that development, the Government has begun taking the first steps in the restructuring of the armed forces. It has earmarked funds to pay the salary arrears and other benefits of some of 630 soldiers to be retired. Since then, the process has advanced. The 630 soldiers were divided into four groups scheduled to retire in April, July, October and December, in accordance with their length of service. The first two batches were paid in July and were discharged. The third batch was paid in early September and will soon be retired. The fourth batch is due to be paid in early November.

47. The first two groups insisted that apart from their salary arrears, they should also be paid a regular salary until December 1999. However, the Government was able to convince the soldiers to withdraw that demand. On 30 August, a group of soldiers arrived at the Finance Ministry and demanded to be paid immediately. They took the Treasurer-General and his staff hostage, and threatened to blow up the building. Interventions by the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister were rebuffed and the authorities therefore sought the good offices of MINURCA and my Special Representative. On 3 October, Mr. Adeniji convened a meeting of representatives of the soldiers and the Ministers of Defence and Finance, and the Prime Minister's military adviser. After a very tense session agreement was reached on a calendar of payment to each of the two groups.

48. To date, donors have made no commitments to provide the much-needed $3.1 million for the programme for the demobilization and reintegration of members of the armed forces. Those funds would facilitate the retirement of a large number of soldiers, which would create vacancies that would, in turn, allow the induction of new recruits to achieve a balanced multi-ethnic composition of the armed forces.

49. Since my previous report, there has been no change in the functions of FORSDIR. In spite of several interventions by my Special Representative, FORSDIR continues to perform duties that properly belong to other branches of the security forces. This remains a cause of concern to the opposition and to the population in general. In a recent meeting with my Special Representative, President Patassé affirmed that FORSDIR would remain deployed at key areas in and near Bangui, as it was the only organized and reliable force at his Government's disposal.

VIII. TRANSITION TO POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

50. In paragraph 17 of its resolution 1230 (1999), the Security Council requested me to consider what role the United Nations might play in the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building in the Central African Republic and also requested me, in consultation with the Government of the Central African Republic, to submit recommendations on a possible United Nations presence in the Central African Republic after the termination of

MINURCA. In its resolution 1230 (1999), the Council expressed its intention to commence the reduction of MINURCA personnel 15 days after the conclusion of the presidential election in the Central African Republic with a view to a full termination of the Mission no later than 15 November.

51. I have given due consideration to this requirement and would like to share with the Security Council some observations in that regard. To date, the international community has made considerable investments in the Central African Republic and has provided its people an opportunity, including through the presence of MINURCA, to work towards national reconciliation and to begin the process of economic recovery. At the same time, it was always understood that such efforts were aimed at creating a situation in which the Central African Republic would be able to continue those processes with international assistance by donors and United Nations agencies and programmes. Admittedly, the Government of the Central African Republic has not fully availed itself of that opportunity. Several vital reforms, which are particularly necessary for long-term security and to which the Central African authorities had committed themselves, have yet to be implemented.

52. At present, there are various aspects of the situation in the Central African Republic that need to be borne in mind in the context of a transition to post-conflict peace-building. The political climate in the country remains tense. The opposition continues to challenge the results of the election, although some recent statements by its leaders indicate a gradual acknowledgement of President Patassé's victory. Suspicions as well as mutual accusations of acquisition of weapons and of recruitment of militias by political leaders persist. Another area of concern is the present condition of the armed forces. Though lacking in equipment and discipline, they are still capable of destabilizing the political and security environment. The restructuring of the armed forces has seen little progress and should be among the new Government's highest priorities.

53. Also requiring attention are such issues as economic and social reform and the restoration of a level of confidence that would encourage foreign investment. It is imperative therefore that, in order to tackle the challenges facing the country, the new Government and the opposition work together in a constructive relationship and in a manner that strengthens democracy in the country.

54. The security situation in the region also needs to be taken into consideration. Several neighbours of the Central African Republic are involved in serious conflict situations, which have already spilled over into the Republic. At the same time, a return of instability in the Central African Republic might pose dangers to its neighbouring countries and lead to additional spillover of conflicts throughout the region, and could further complicate efforts to bring peace to Central Africa.

55. I am also mindful of the strong wish of the Government of the Central African Republic that MINURCA remain in the country well beyond 15 November 1999, to continue to provide a measure of security during the period following the election. The opposition, for its part, has also expressed apprehension with regard to the consequences of a withdrawal by MINURCA without

restructured national armed forces in place. Their preoccupations include fears of being subjected to oppression by FORSDIR. United Nations agencies and programmes operating in the Central African Republic believe that it would be important for the international community to assist strengthening security in the country, which would allow them to proceed with their programmes.

56. In the circumstances, I believe it would be appropriate to recommend a short but gradual transition from United Nations peacekeeping involvement in the Central African Republic to post-conflict peace-building. During such a transition, MINURCA would continue to provide assistance in the implementation of major reforms and its good offices to promote national reconciliation. At the same time, it would also facilitate, in coordination with relevant United Nations agencies and programmes and the Bretton Woods institutions, a smooth transformation from the current international involvement to post-conflict peace-building. The MINURCA military component would continue to discharge its present security functions in Bangui, which it would gradually hand over to local security and law enforcement forces. The proposed transition would also allow MINURCA to complete a six-month training course for 180 local police recruits.

57. To facilitate this period, a serious and concerted effort will be required to speed up the programme of demobilization and reintegration of soldiers. Along with the restructuring of the armed forces, those activities will obviously require additional financial support from the international community. In that regard, the Secretariat is planning to convene a meeting in New York in the coming months to solicit much-needed funds to support relevant programmes.

58. During the transition period, MINURCA would gradually reduce its military strength. At present, the withdrawal and repatriation of military personnel, which had been deployed to support the election, has begun. I would propose that the reduction of MINURCA be conducted in stages. A first batch of three infantry companies would depart from Bangui by mid-December 1999, with a second batch of two infantry companies and a logistic support element departing in January 2000. A third group, consisting of an infantry company, a light tank company and a medical unit, would then depart by 15 February 2000, leaving an element of 185 military personnel, which would be needed to provide security for United Nations personnel and protect United Nations assets in Bangui during the liquidation of the mission. During the transitional period, the Mission's substantive and administrative personnel would also be reduced in a gradual fashion, taking into account any requirements by a post-conflict peace-building presence.

59. To finalize the possible mandate and requirements of a post-conflict peace-building presence of the United Nations in the Central African Republic, I intend to dispatch shortly a small multi-disciplinary mission to Bangui, led by the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP. The Mission will proceed on the assumption that, in accordance with the wishes of the authorities of the Central African Republic, the United Nations will maintain a presence in the country following the termination of the mandate of MINURCA. The presence would take the form of a small political office, to be established after the end of the political presence of MINURCA on 15 February 2000. The functions of such an office would be based on the proposals contained in paragraphs 13 to 15 of my

sixth report (S/1999/621). At the present stage, I envisage that the office would closely monitor developments in the political, socio-economic, human rights and security spheres. In particular, it would facilitate a continued dialogue among the political actors, so as to promote reconciliation and national unity. It would also provide good offices, when necessary, in resolving disputes among political parties and support efforts aimed at promoting democratization and good governance. The office would offer political guidance and a framework for integrating the activities of the United Nations system in the Central African Republic in support of the new Government's post-conflict peace-building programmes, including the promotion of a culture of peace and human rights programmes. In that regard, it would be expected to work closely with United Nations agencies, in particular UNDP, and the Bretton Woods institutions to assist in the economic recovery of the country and to encourage the continuation of the necessary economic reform programmes. In addition, it would also be my intention to include in the planned office a small number of military and civilian police advisers to follow closely security-related reforms to be implemented by the Government in cooperation with bilateral donors, including the restructuring of the armed forces and demobilization and reintegration programmes. I intend to revert to the Security Council with detailed proposals on such a small office in early December 1999.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

60. As indicated in my previous report to the Security Council (S/1999/788, para. 50), the General Assembly, in its resolution 53/238 of 8 June 1999, appropriated an amount of $33.4 million for the operation of MINURCA for the period from 1 July to 15 November 1999 and its subsequent liquidation and administrative closing until 30 June 2000. With regard to the estimated costs associated with the supportive role that MINURCA has been authorized to play in the conduct of the presidential election, I have obtained authorization from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to enter into commitments to incur additional expenditure in the amount of $6.7 million.

61. Should the Council approve my recommendation contained in paragraphs 56-58 above, I shall inform the Council of the related requirements and shall seek additional resources from the General Assembly accordingly.

62. As at 15 September 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURCA special account amounted to $67.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,877.9 million. With regard to the trust fund for the support of activities of MINURCA, contributions as at 30 September 1999 totalled $0.87 million, with expenditures authorized in the full amount of contributions received.

X. OBSERVATIONS

63. It is gratifying that, in spite of high levels of tension during the electoral campaign, high numbers of Central African voters went to the polls in a peaceful and calm manner. In doing so, the people of the Central African Republic once again demonstrated their desire for peace, stability and

development and I congratulate them on their sense of responsibility and calm during that milestone event.

64. Credit is also due to the considerable efforts of the international community, which made it possible for the election to be properly supported. The much-needed bilateral assistance provided by the Governments of Canada, China, Egypt, France, Gabon, Japan, Nigeria and the United States of America, the European Union and UNDP were, without doubt, instrumental in that regard.

65. Now it is up to the people and leaders - Government and opposition - of the Central African Republic to build on that important achievement and to proceed with all due speed with the process of major reform and national reconciliation. I hope that all political parties will now put the politics of the electoral campaign behind them and establish an effective and constructive dialogue, which is essential to enable the country to move forward.

66. In these endeavours, I hope that the Central African Republic would be able to count on the continuing assistance of the international community. As described in section VIII above, I recommend that such assistance now proceed from the peacekeeping phase to post-conflict peace-building. Having said that, I am conscious of the risks involved in a transition that may not give the Central African Republic enough time to fully prepare itself for the next challenging phase. The potentially destabilizing effects of conflicts in the region must also be borne in mind.

67. I therefore recommend that the Security Council authorize a gradual reduction of MINURCA during a three-month transition period, with a view to ending the Mission on 15 February 2000. For several years, the international community, including MINURCA and its predecessor the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements, has done much to assist the people and Government of the Central African Republic on the path of national reconciliation and economic recovery. I trust that they will now be prepared to begin assuming full responsibility for the future of their country, which, in the final analysis, can only be changed for the better by the Central Africans themselves. At the same time, I trust that the international community will continue to encourage and support all positive developments in the Central African Republic. I therefore call upon donors to provide much-needed financial assistance and to support the restructuring of the armed forces as well as the process of economic and social reform and development in the Central African Republic.

68. Lastly, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander, Major General Barthélémy Ratanga (Gabon), to all MINURCA personnel, as well as to United Nations agencies and programmes operating in the country, for their tireless efforts and commendable dedication during the reporting period, in particular during the presidential election.

Annex

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic: contributions as at 7 October 1999

Country	Staff observers	Support unit	Troops	Total
Burkina Faso	6	-	120	126
Canada	4	57	-	61[a]
Chad	6	-	120	126
Côte d'Ivoire	10	15	210	235
Egypt	8	291	120	419
Gabon	8	-	120	128[b]
Senegal	9	-	120	129
Togo	6	-	120	126
Total	57	363	930	1 350[c]

[a] Does not include national support elements (23).

[b] In addition to the Force Commander.

[c] In addition to 24 civilian police observers from Benin (2), Cameroon (1), Côte d'Ivoire (1), France (7), Mali (6), Portugal (2), Senegal (3) and Tunisia (2).



Map No. 4060 Rev. 4 - UNITED NATIONS
August 1999

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section


MINURCA
Deployment of
Observation Sites
National capital
Provincial capital
Town, village
International boundary
Provincial boundary
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
CHAD
SUDAN
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CAMEROON
CONGO
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
UNMO (Temporary)
Birao
Ndele
UNMO (Temporary)
UNMO
Kaga Bandoro
UNMO
Bossangoa
UNMO
Bozoum
UNMO
Bouar
UNMO
Bambari
UNMO
Bangassou
UNMO
Mobaye
Bangui
HQ
MINURCA
UNMO
Berberati

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1039
8 October 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that 183 mines, bombs, missiles and other unexploded ordnance left behind by the 30-Power aggression against Iraq were found and disposed of in various parts of Iraq between 1 August and 30 September 1999. The items included missiles, cluster bombs, spherical bombs, strip bombs and mines, and they were found in the following governorates: Baghdad, Ninawa, Basrah, Babil, Salah al-Din, Ta'mim, Dhi Qar and Muthanna.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-29328 (E) 081099 081099

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1040
8 October 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FINLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the statement issued on 6 October 1999 by the Presidency of the European Union on the presidential election and referendum in Abkhazia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Marjatta RASI
Permanent Representative of Finland
to the United Nations

99-29334 (E) 081099 081099

/...

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the presidential election and referendum in Abkhazia issued on 6 October 1999 by the Presidency of the European Union

The European Union regrets that the authorities in Abkhazia, Georgia, held so-called presidential elections on 3 October together with a referendum on the Constitution of Abkhazia. The elections were described as unacceptable and illegitimate by the Security Council in its resolution 1255 (1999) of 30 July 1999. The European Union considers the elections and the referendum null and void and the holding of them detrimental to the efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict within the Geneva process.

Simultaneously, the European Union wants to reiterate the necessity of finding a definitive and just solution to the Abkhazian problem through political negotiation. The solution should show respect for the territorial integrity of Georgia and the necessity of granting maximum autonomy for Abkhazia, which would permit the Abkhazians to express their identity within Georgia.

It must be underlined that it is equally essential to ensure a safe return for the refugees.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus and Malta and the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein members of the European Economic Area align themselves with the present statement.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1999/1041
8 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 6 October 1999, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-29340 (E) 081099

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Annex

Letter dated 6 October 1999 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the monthly report on the operations of the Stabilization Force. I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Enclosure

Monthly report to the Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force

1. Over the reporting period (21 August-20 September), there were approximately 31,000 troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and from 16 non-NATO countries. Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols, with combat aircraft flying approximately 93 hours.

2. SFOR troops continued to monitor compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1160 (1998), prohibiting the transport of weapons into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with an intensified presence on the ground, in order to enforce the embargo. Encouraging results have been reported in weapons being handed over voluntarily by the entities, or being uncovered by SFOR.

3. SFOR continues to monitor the movement of controlled petroleum products into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by establishing traffic control points, and to date, 26 violations have been reported. SFOR handed over responsibility for the vehicles in question to the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) or to local police, who subsequently escorted them back to their point of origin. An SFOR monitoring team has also been deployed to the refinery in Bosanski Brod to receive advance information on fuel movements, in order to increase the efficiency of border controls.

4. On 31 August, two hand grenades exploded at a building belonging to the Joint Commission Observers in Doboj. The building was damaged, but there were no injuries to personnel.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

5. Over the reporting period, the situation in theatre remained stable, with the entities in substantial compliance with the military provisions of the Peace Agreement. There was moderate reaction in the Republika Srpska to the detention of General Talic, the Bosnian Serb Army Chief-of-Staff, in Vienna on 24 August, but the political situation there remains tense.

6. Over the reporting period, there were again isolated incidents of intimidation and violence in response to the return of refugees and displaced persons, with houses damaged or destroyed by grenades or home-made bombs. At the end of August, approximately 60 Bosnian Serbs, en route to a scheduled house assessment, were confronted by a group of around 50 violent and hostile Bosniacs near Bocinja in Multinational Division North (MND (North)). SFOR troops monitored the situation and provided security support to the IPTF and to local police on the ground. There were no injuries, and the Bosnian Serbs decided to postpone their visit. At the beginning of September, Bosniac returnees were shelled with five mortar rounds when resettling in the area of Faziagica Kula in

MND (South-East). There were no casualties, but SFOR troops monitored the area and continue to maintain a presence there.

7. Despite these incidents, during the month of August there was a significant increase in the number of minority returns of displaced persons and refugees as compared with the month of July. In August, SFOR troops monitored 5,641 minority returns and over 7,000 displaced persons and refugees conducted house visits and cleanings.

8. On 25 August, locals in the Bosniac district of Lipa in MND (South-West) once again established a roadblock outside the SFOR base there, in protest at the extra traffic generated by SFOR convoys crossing the village. The protests continued for approximately three days until the roadblock was removed on order of the local authorities.

9. Over the reporting period, SFOR conducted a total of 357 military weapons storage sites inspections: 126 Bosniac; 70 Bosnian Croat; 121 Bosnian Serb; and 40 Federation.

10. SFOR troops monitored a total of 1,071 training and movement activities: 437 Bosniac; 127 Bosnian Croat; 409 Bosnian Serb; and 98 Federation. The training and movement ban on the Republika Srpska Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade remains in effect until further notice, because of the Brigade's non-compliance with instructions of the Commander of SFOR to the parties.

11. The summer demining campaign continued, with the deployment of 44 Entity Armed Forces demining teams. Over the reporting period, these teams conducted 621 mine-clearing operations, removing 5 anti-tank mines, 484 anti-personnel mines and 15 items of unexploded ordnance from 71,839 square metres of land.

12. On 9 September, a meeting of the Joint Military Commission took place at SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo. Among the topics discussed were training and movement activities, ammunition storage implementation and Brcko demilitarization. The next meeting is scheduled for 9 December.

Cooperation with international organizations

13. Within capabilities, and in accordance with its mandate, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the United Nations Mission in Bosnia (UNMIBH) and IPTF, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

14. SFOR continues to play an active role in supporting OHR efforts to establish joint institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the Standing Committee on Military Matters. As reported last month, significant progress had been made over the summer period in the establishment of the new secretariat of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, with the basic

administrative infrastructure largely in place, and rules of procedure having been agreed "ad referendum". However, following the detention of General Talic at the end of August, the Republika Srpska delegation refused to attend the 8 September meeting of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, which was consequently cancelled. Firm action by OHR, SFOR and OSCE, including a joint demarche by the High Representative, the Commander of SFOR and the Head of OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared to have resolved the issue, and the meeting was rescheduled for 23 September. However, the meeting was again postponed until early October.

Outlook

15. The return of refugees and displaced persons is likely to continue to lead to isolated acts of intimidation and violence.

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GENERAL

S/1999/1042
12 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that, since 28 September 1999, a battalion of the Georgian Army has been pursuing the mission in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as part of the Turkish regiment in the German zone of responsibility.

This is the first participation of the Georgian battalion in international peacekeeping, in particular in the international security presence established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter CHKHEIDZE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-29486 (E) 121099

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1043
13 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and my mission of good offices in Cyprus.

You will recall that on 27 July 1999, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, I informed the Council that Dame Ann Hercus would be relinquishing her post as Special Representative and Chief of Mission in Cyprus as of 30 September.

In that connection, I wish to inform the Security Council that I have appointed Mr. James Holger as my Acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission of UNFICYP for a period of three months effective 1 October 1999.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-29567 (E) 131099

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1044
13 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 7 October 1999 (S/1999/1043) concerning your appointment of Mr. James Holger as your Acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a period of three months effective 1 October 1999 has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the appointment.

(Signed) Sergey V. LAVROV
President of the Security Council

99-29573 (E) 131099

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1045
11 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on 11 October 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-29417 (E) 111099

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Annex

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia
on 11 October 1999

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is dismayed by the continued posturing of the Eritrean regime as the "champion of peace", while continuing to occupy Ethiopian territory. Eritrea's noise for "peace" is only a veneer intended to obscure its underlying true character of aggression and warmongering.

It should be clear to all that it is Eritrea which is being required to withdraw its troops from areas forcibly occupied since 6 May 1998. That fact is at the centre of the crisis that has been imposed on Ethiopia. Unless Eritrea "removes the gun it has put at the head of Ethiopia", withdraws from all Ethiopian territories that it has occupied by force, and stops training, arming and supporting terrorists and warlords, and puts an end to its acts aimed at destabilizing the Horn of Africa, it is obvious that durable peace will not be achieved.

Unfortunately the statements and acts of Eritrea's leaders do not give rise to confidence in their readiness to reach a peaceful settlement. On 4 October 1999, the Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the first time named the occupied town of Zalanbessa as sovereign Eritrean territory. That Eritrea could make such a ludicrous claim only underlines how important it is for Ethiopia to ensure that iron-clad guarantees are in place before embarking on any journey of peace with Eritrea.

If in the ongoing Organization of African Unity (OAU) process to achieve a peaceful solution Ethiopia is guaranteed the return of all its territories and a full and unequivocal return to the status quo ante as is required by international law, Ethiopia would be ready, as ever, to fulfil its obligations on the basis of the OAU peace proposals including, among other things, engaging in the process that includes delimitation and demarcation of the border and to avail itself of the necessary arbitration if required. If Eritrean aggression is peacefully reversed there is no reason why Ethiopia would resort to taking defensive measures that would entail the loss of lives and the destruction of property. That is not the choice of Ethiopia.

Ethiopia has legitimate concerns that need to be met. As it is a victim of aggression, meeting Ethiopia's legitimate concerns is the least that can be done. It is important that the OAU peace process not get bogged down because loopholes on the issue of full and unequivocal return to the status quo ante are available for Eritrea to exploit. Ethiopia is therefore continuing its dialogue with OAU in the hope of ensuring that a durable peace is achieved in the shortest possible time. No amount of posturing and political grandstanding by Eritrea will deter Ethiopia from its path. A wiser and more practical choice for Eritrea would be to avoid histrionics and to clearly identify the areas which it is obliged to vacate as per the provisions of the peace proposal on the table.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1046
11 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have been instructed by my Government to bring to your attention the dramatic situation of several thousand Serbs and a few hundred Roma at Orahovac in Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia. The so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has blocked access to humanitarian convoys for a couple of months now, preventing delivery of food, while Albanian terrorists obstruct water and power supplies to the Serb-populated part of the town. Particularly difficult is the situation of over 1,000 Serbian and Roma children who, in addition to being exposed to daily harassment, have been prevented from attending school.

Instead of fulfilling their obligations and lifting the blockade which is contrary to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), as well as resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) and ensuring personal safety and property security, including the freedom of movement, the United Nations security and civil presences seek to organize evacuation convoys in order to resettle the Serbs and other non-Albanians from Orahovac. This undisguised fawning before Albanian terrorist separatists is grist to the mill of their systematic attempts to create an ethnically pure Kosovo and Metohija.

May I recall that KFOR has removed a number of roadblocks erected by the Serbs to protest various shortcomings, as they perceived them, in the fulfilment of the KFOR mandate (most pointedly the roadblock on the Pristina-Pec road), but that nothing has been done to remove the Albanian obstacles to the entry of the Russian troops in Orahovac for almost two months. This policy of double standards is detrimental to the goals and objectives set by the United Nations presences and must be discontinued immediately.

In bringing these facts to your attention, I expect that they will be taken account of during the consideration of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1047
11 October 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 11 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States and British aircraft based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey continued between 1 and 8 October 1999 and that the aircraft in question engaged in acts of aggression, reconnaissance activities and acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with the United States, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the facilities for these acts of aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

These actions are continuing to bring death and injury to hundreds of civilians and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The logistic support that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey provide to the United States and British forces makes them key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they share international responsibility for the consequences of these actions. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek lawful compensation for the damage being inflicted on its people by these same actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations by United States and British aircraft and damage caused, 1-8 October 1999

1. In the northern region 42 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres over the following cities and towns: Dohuk, Ninawa (Nineveh), Amadiyah, Tall Afar, Irbil, Zakho, Baibo, Rawanduz, Aqrah, Mosul, Dukan, Irbil North and Ayn Zalah.

2. In the southern region 365 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basrah, Amarah, Artawi, Jalibah, Salman, Hashimiyah, Suq al-Shuyukh, Nu'maniyah, Kut, Shaykh Sa'd, Qal'at Sukkar, Rifa'i, Ushbayjah, Shinafiyah, Hayy, Qal'at Salih, Lasaf, Afak, Bathah, Rumaythah, Taqtaqanah, Diwaniyah, Najaf, Shatrah, Busayyah, Qurnah and Faw.

3. At 1200 hours on 1 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 36 missions, 14 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 22 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Nasiriyah, Lasaf, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Samarah, Salman, Jalibah and Qal'at Salih areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1300 hours, drove them off.

4. At 1150 hours on 2 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 56 missions, 34 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 22 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Nasiriyah, Lasaf, Diwaniyah, Samawah, Kut, Jalibah, Salman, Ushbayjah, Shinafiyah, Shatrah, Rifa'i, Busayyah, Taqtaqanah, Afak and Nu'maniyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1330 hours, drove them off.

5. At 1245 hours on 3 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 12 missions from Turkish airspace, were supported from there by an AWACS command and control aircraft and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Rawanduz, Aqrah, Amadiyah, Ayn Zalah and Zakho areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1505 hours, drove them off.

6. At 1115 hours on 4 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 85 missions, 69 of them from Saudi territory and 16 from Kuwaiti territory, and

were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft from inside Saudi airspace and an E-2C aircraft from inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Kut, Diwaniyah, Nu'maniyah, Basrah, Amarah and Afak areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1305 hours, drove them off.

7. At 1600 hours on 5 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18 and Tornado aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 58 missions, 28 of them from Saudi territory and 30 from Kuwaiti territory, and were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft from inside Saudi airspace and an E-2C aircraft from inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah, Shinafiyah, Salman, Basrah, Bathah, Rumaythah, Diwaniyah, Rifa'i, Qal'at Sukkar, Shatrah, Samawah, Hayy, Artawi, Jalibah and Faw areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2357 hours, drove them off.

8. At 1550 hours on 6 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 24 missions, 12 of them from Saudi territory and 12 from Kuwaiti territory, and were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft from inside Saudi airspace and an E-2C aircraft from inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Ushbayjah, Salman, Nasiriyah, Rifa'i, Basrah, Samawah, Artawi and Diwaniyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1710 hours, drove them off.

9. At 1155 hours on 6 October 1999 United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 missions from Turkish airspace, were supported from there by an AWACS command and control aircraft and overflew the Zakho, Rawanduz, Amadiyah, Baibo, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar, Dukan and Irbil North areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1505 hours, drove them off.

10. At 1440 hours on 7 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 48 missions from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Najaf, Diwaniyah, Samawah, Salman, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Jalibah and Rifa'i areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1555 hours, drove them off.

11. At 0857 hours on 8 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 58 missions, 46 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 12 from Kuwaiti

territory with the support of an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Salman, Artawi, Jalibah, Busayyah, Samawah, Nasiriyah, Shinafiyah, Diwaniyah, Lasaf, Hashimiyah, Nu'maniyah, Kut, Shaykh Sa'd, Qal'at Sukkar, Rifa'i, Amarah and Basrah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1035 hours, drove them off.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1048
11 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 864 (1993) CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of my letter to the Managing Director of De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited in reply to his letter of 5 October 1999 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter, together with its annex, were circulated to members of Security Council for their information and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Robert R. FOWLER
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 864 (1993)
concerning the situation in Angola

99-29442 (E) 111099

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Annex

Letter dated 11 October 1999 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the Managing Director of the De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited

Thank you for your important letter of 5 October 1999, in which you outline further action to be taken by De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited in support of the measures against UNITA contained in Security Council resolution 1173 (1998). The members of the Angola Sanctions Committee very much appreciate these additional steps, which give force and specific expression to your company's commitment both to adhere to the decisions of the Security Council on sanctions against UNITA diamond sales and to assist the Sanctions Committee in its efforts to render them effective. We look forward to continued collaboration between De Beers and both the Committee and the expert panels established by resolution 1237 (1999).

(Signed) Robert R. FOWLER
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 864 (1993)
concerning the situation in Angola

Appendix

Letter dated 5 October 1999 from the Managing Director of the De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola

I am writing to you in your capacity as Chairman of the Angolan Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. You are aware that De Beers has never bought diamonds from UNITA and that, since the promulgation of resolution 1173 (1998), it has not bought Angolan diamonds without the requisite certificate of origin. As part of the ongoing efforts of De Beers to assist the United Nations and the Angolan Government, De Beers has now resolved to take the following further action:

- To suspend buying anywhere in the world any parcels of Angolan diamonds whatsoever;
- To withdraw from the Codiam joint venture in Angola and thereby effectively to have no further interest in any diamond buying offices in Angola;
- To review our other buying operations in Central and West Africa with a view to withdrawal (other than Angola, these buying offices are limited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guinea).

De Beers' position will be kept under review in consultation with the United Nations, the Government of Angola and the Governments of other African diamond-producing countries.

An exception to De Beers' decision to suspend the purchase of Angolan diamonds pertains to the production emanating from the organization Sociedade de Desolvimento Mineiro, a joint venture involving Endiama, Ashton and Odebrecht. Because of the formal nature of this mining operation, there can be no doubt about the provenance of this diamond production, which De Beers is contracted to buy.

De Beers' decisions are motivated by its deep concern for the human suffering evident in Angola as a result of the civil strife; and our wish to help the United Nations and the Angolan Government to bring peace to this war-torn country.

I enclose a copy of the press release which we shall be disseminating today, Tuesday, 5 October.

(Signed) G. M. RALFE

Enclosure

PRESS RELEASE

Angolan diamonds

The diamond mining and marketing company De Beers today announced that it had placed an embargo on the purchase of all diamonds from Angola by its buying offices around the world. It was also ending its participation in all buying operations in Angola and was reviewing its buying operations in other West and Central African countries, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guinea. De Beers ended its buying operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone more than 14 years ago.

Mindful of its responsibilities and its relations with the Angolan Government, which is its partner in all its diamond buying and prospecting activities in Angola, De Beers has never bought diamonds from UNITA. Moreover, since the promulgation of Security Council resolution 1173 (1998), which imposed United Nations sanctions in June last year, De Beers buyers on the open market has been instructed not to purchase rough diamonds without an Angolan Government certificate of origin. Where such provenance was doubtful or uncertain, De Beers buyers had consistently refused to purchase. As a result of these measures, De Beers' purchases of Angolan diamonds on the open market have already dropped to negligible levels.

The company has, however, for some time been considering further action, namely a worldwide embargo on all Angolan diamond purchases to reinforce the sanctions against UNITA in line with its commitments to the Angolan Government. The position will be kept under review in consultation with the United Nations, other producing countries and the Angolan Government.

Announcing the decision in London today, the Managing Director of De Beers, Mr. Gary Ralfe said that De Beers would continue to urge its clients, among them the world's leading diamantaires, to adopt a similar policy and to support this initiative in the conduct of their own business.

Mr. Ralfe pointed out that De Beers had withdrawn its buyers from Angola a year ago. By closing down its buying offices in Angola and banning the purchase of all Angolan diamonds, De Beers was going much further than the sanctions imposed last year by the United Nations in its efforts to curtail the UNITA diamond trade. The only operation exempt from the worldwide embargo would be those diamonds which De Beers was contractually obliged to purchase from SDM, a joint venture operation in the formal mining sector, controlled by the Angolan Government and run by the Australian mining company, Ashton.

De Beers shared the world's deep concern over the continued suffering of the people of Angola, for more than 30 years the victims of a brutal and devastating civil war, he said. It was equally concerned that, in addition to revenues from oil and other natural resources, some of the funds which had fuelled the war had been derived from the illegal sale of diamonds by the UNITA rebel movement.

Mr. Ralfe pointed out that about 90 per cent of world diamond production came from Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, the Russian Federation, Canada and Australia, and in some of these countries the diamond industry made a major contribution to their economies. For example, Botswana, which before the discovery of diamonds was one of the poorest countries in the world, was now one of the most successful economies in Africa. This success was critically dependent on its diamond industry which directly employs more than 6,000 Botswana citizens and indirectly provides employment to more than 300,000. Diamonds account for 70 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings and 65 per cent of all Government revenues. Mr. Ralfe added that he was concerned that legitimate business, particularly in developing countries, should not be damaged by laudable attempts to reduce income from flowing into the coffers of rebel movements.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1049
12 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1252 (1999) of 15 July 1999, I should like to inform you of the status of negotiations between the Government of Croatia and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the security issue of Prevlaka.

The bilateral negotiations on the issue of Prevlaka have so far proven futile. The major reason for the lack of any result remains the unfounded and unacceptable pretensions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia towards a part of the territory of Croatia, as well as its lack of political willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue on the security arrangements for Prevlaka.

The last round of negotiations was held in Belgrade on 9 March 1999. At that meeting, despite the fact that the question of international borders was not a subject of negotiations, the delegation of Croatia, motivated by a desire to expedite the negotiating process, handed to the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia documentation clearly proving where the existing international border between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lay. The documentation contained, inter alia, a photocopy of the letter and map that had been signed in 1992 by the then-Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Milan Panić, and the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, General Živadin Panić, and which had also been sent to Cyrus Vance, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and General Satish Nambiar, Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (see S/1999/783). The map clearly indicated where the existing border between the two States was extended, while the letter confirmed the readiness of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to honour the existing borders. Subsequently, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia disputed the authenticity of the signatures of its high officials.

Aware of the importance for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of ascertaining the authenticity of the above-mentioned signatures in order to resume negotiations on a security arrangement for the Prevlaka area, the Head of the Croatian delegation proposed in his letter dated 29 July 1999 addressed to the Chairman of the Yugoslav delegation, that the next meeting be held in Zagreb during the month of September 1999. The determination of the date of the next

meeting was left open, pending the reply of the Yugoslav delegation concerning the authenticity of the above-mentioned signatures.

Given that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has indicated that it would respect the Opinions of the (Badinter) Arbitration Commission (see S/1999/760, annex) and, in that way, accept that the borders between the former republics have become the international borders of the newly emerged States after the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the above-mentioned letter and map should be sufficient to dispel any reasonable doubt concerning the extension of the border. However, the unusual delay by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in verifying the authenticity of the signatures of its former Prime Minister and Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggests that it is deliberately avoiding a reply.

Another practical problem in regard to the scheduling of the next meeting arises from possible objections to the legitimacy of the Yugoslav delegation. As was indicated in previous correspondence between Croatia and the United Nations, the representatives of the Government of Montenegro, one of the two constituent units of the Yugoslav federation, are not represented in the Yugoslav delegation as a result of their support for the opening of border-crossing points at the existing international border between the two States. Although the border-crossing points at Konfin and Debeli Brijeg have been opened upon agreement between Croatia and Montenegro, the Montenegrin authorities continue to be unrepresented in the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since that time. Taking into account that the delimitation at sea has not yet been undertaken, and considering the provisions of the Federal and Montenegrin constitutions on the question of borders, the absence of the Montenegrin representatives from the Yugoslav delegation renders the legitimacy of any outcome doubtful. Additionally, the legacy of the Kosovo crisis upon the federal authorities, when the international community, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, intervened in order to halt ethnic cleansing, has not encouraged the scheduling of formal bilateral meetings.

In my letter of 7 January 1999 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/19), my Government indicated that the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) had been "used by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities as a mechanism for postponing full reintegration of the last part of Croatian territory following its occupation", and warned that "continuation of the UNMOP mandate without decisive impetus from the Security Council will be pointless". Since such an impetus has not yet been given, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continues to misuse UNMOP for the purpose of indefinitely stalling negotiations; the presence of UNMOP no longer "maintain(s) conditions that are conducive to a negotiated settlement" (Security Council resolution 1147 (1998) of 13 January 1998). In such circumstances, the United Nations resources being expended on UNMOP could certainly be put to better use in peacekeeping operations with much more pressing need.

Given the record of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in negotiations, Croatia, as a host country, maintains its right, as a last resort, to unilaterally, in full compliance with its rights and duties under international law, terminate its consent to the mandate of UNMOP. In this respect, I should like to emphasize that Croatia is fully committed to its obligation under

Article 4 of the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (A/51/351-S/1996/744, annex). Accordingly, even in that case, Croatia would continue to respect the security regime established during United Nations monitoring until mutual agreement on the issue of Prevlaka is reached between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Croatia reiterates its readiness to continue the bilateral negotiations on the security issue of Prevlaka based on the relevant Security Council resolutions, Articles 1 and 4 of the Agreement on Normalization of Relations and the general principles of international law. Furthermore, Croatia shall continue to work on entrenching stability by promoting the free movement of civilians and other confidence-building measures with the Montenegrin authorities in order to build upon the existing positive trend.

I should like to request your kind assistance in distributing the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan ŠIMONOVIĆ
Permanent Representative